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STANDARD OF REVIEW 
This is an appeal from the trial court's granting summary 
judgment in favor of the City and UDOT. In deciding whether the 
trial court properly granted summary judgment, the Supreme Court 
gives no deference to the trial court's view of the law. The 
Supreme Court reviews the trial court's conclusions for 
correctness. Ron Case Roofing and Asphalt Paving, Inc. v. 
Bloomquist, 773 P.2d 1152 (Utah 1989); Kelson v. Salt Lake County, 
784 P.2d 1152 (Utah 1989). 
The plaintiff/appellant, Nicholas Lamarr, pursuant to 
Rule 24(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, submits the 
following Brief. 
JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction to decide this appeal 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(j). This is an appeal from 
a final Order of Dismissal of the Third Judicial District Court in 
and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable Homer F. 
Wilkinson presiding. The Order of Dismissal entered by the trial 
court granted summary judgment in favor the defendants Utah State 
Department of Transportation and Salt Lake City and dismissed the 
plaintiff's complaint against both the defendants with prejudice. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
The following issues are presented to this Court for 
review. 
1. Did the trial court err in concluding that the 
defendant Salt Lake City owed no general duty to the plaintiff for 
the construction, maintenance and/or signing of the North Temple 
Overpass? 
2. Did the trial court err in concluding that the 
defendant Salt Lake City owed no private duty to the plaintiff for 
controlling the transient population under the North Temple 
Overpass? 
3. Did the trial court err in concluding that the 
conduct of the defendants Salt Lake City and Utah State Department 
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of Transportation was not a proximate cause of the plaintiffs 
injuries? 
4. Did the trial court err in concluding that any duty 
of the defendant Salt Lake City to control the transient population 
under the North Temple Overpass is an immune discretionary function 
under Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10 (1) (a) ? May Lamarr pursue this 
claim against the City even if transient control is an immune 
discretionary function? 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY AUTHORITY 
The interpretation of the following statutory provisions 
is determinative of certain issues on appeal. The language of 
these statutes is set out in the Addendum to this Brief pursuant to 
Rule 24(f)(2) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
Utah Code Ann. § 27-14-2 
Utah Code Ann. § 27-14-4 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-4 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-8 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-9 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10 
1987) 
1987) 
1987) 
1987) 
1987) 
l)(a) (1987). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. 
This is a negligence action brought by Nicholas Lamarr 
against Salt Lake City ("City") and Utah State Department of 
Transportation ("UDOT"), alleging that the City and UDOT were 
negligent in, among other things, failing to properly construct, 
maintain and/or sign the North Temple Overpass ("Overpass") and for 
failing to properly control the transient population underneath the 
Overpass. 
B. Course of Proceedings. 
After some discovery was conducted at the trial court 
level, the City moved for summary judgment on the following four 
grounds (R. 144-152). 
1. That the City owed no general duty to the plaintiff 
for the construction, maintenance and/or signing of the Overpass; 
2. That the City owed no private duty to the plaintiff 
for transient control; 
3. That the plaintiff failed to establish that the 
conduct of the City was a proximate cause of the plaintiff's 
injuries; 
4. That highway maintenance and police activities are 
immune discretionary functions under Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-
10(l)(a). 
UDOT filed a Supplemental Motion for Summary Judgment, 
joining the City in ground 3 and part of ground 4, the proximate 
cause and highway maintenance discretionary function issues. (R. 
156-157) . 
After briefing and oral argument, the trial court granted 
summary judgment in favor of both the City and UDOT. (R. 287-290). 
The trial court concluded that: 
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1. The defendant Salt Lake City owed no general duty to 
the plaintiff for the construction, maintenance or signing of the 
North Temple Overpass; 
2. The defendant Salt Lake City owed no private duty to 
the plaintiff for controlling the transient population under the 
North Temple Overpass; 
3. The conduct of the defendants Salt Lake City and UDOT 
was not a proximate cause of the plaintiff's injuries; 
4. Any duty of the defendant Salt Lake City to control 
the transient population under the North Temple Overpass is an 
immune discretionary function under Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-
10(1)(a); and 
5. The construction, maintenance and signing of the 
North Temple Overpass is not an immune discretionary function under 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10(1)(a). 
Based on these conclusions of law, the trial court 
dismissed the plaintiff's complaint against the City and UDOT with 
prejudice. The plaintiff appeals that order of dismissal. 
C. Statement of Facts. 
1. On April 18, 1987, Nicholas Lamarr, was visiting Salt 
Lake City from Wyoming. At approximately 10:30 p.m., Lamarr was 
walking east across the North Temple Overpass ("Overpass). (R. 3). 
2. At that time, Lamarr was struck by a car going west 
driven by Stanley Cross. The Cross car was forced into Lamarr by 
a car driven by Don Ainsworth. (R. 3). 
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3. As a result of being hit by the Cross car, Lamarr was 
thrown over the side of the Overpass and fell to the ground below, 
suffering serious and permanent personal injuries, including,but 
not limited to, fractures of the left fibula and left tibia, 
fractures of the right femur, and extensive right knee damage 
requiring multiple surgeries• (R. 3, 6). 
4. On the night of the accident, before the accident, 
Lamarr had walked from east to west across the Overpass, using the 
pedestrian walkway located on the south side of the Overpass. That 
pedestrian walkway extends halfway across the Overpass and, from 
there, steps lead pedestrians to the ground underneath the 
Overpass. (R. 3). 
5. Transients commonly congregate under the North Temple 
Overpass. (R. 3). 
6. Lamarr was frightened and harassed by transients as 
he left the pedestrian walkway, went down the stairs and ended up 
underneath the Overpass. (R. 3, 4). 
7. After getting something to eat at a restaurant on the 
westside of the Overpass, Lamarr started back to his hotel, which 
was located on the east side of the Overpass. (R. 4). 
8. To avoid the threats, harassment and possible 
physical violence presented by the transients congregated around 
the pedestrian walkway stairway located underneath the Overpass, 
Lamarr began to cross the Overpass itself, walking east on the left 
side of the roadway. (R. 4). 
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9. There are no signs or other traffic control devices 
on, or adjacent to, the Overpass prohibiting or regulating 
pedestrian traffic on the Overpass, nor is there an alternative 
route for pedestrians to take, other than walking many blocks 
around the Overpass. (R. 4). 
10. While walking on the Overpass, Lamarr was involved 
in the accident and suffered the injuries mentioned above. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The City has a general duty to construct and/or maintain 
pedestrian safety devices on and adjacent to the North Temple 
Overpass. Utah Code Ann. § 27-14-2 and Utah Code Ann. § 27-14-4 
provide that the City shares responsibility with UDOT and may be 
liable for the failure to maintain and/or construct such pedestrian 
safety control devices. Salt Lake City raised this general duty 
issue in a motion for summary judgment twice in the trial court. 
The first time, after reviewing the memoranda filed and hearing 
oral argument on that issue, the trial court denied the City's 
motion for summary judgment. When the City raised the issue a 
second time, no new evidence was submitted in support of the 
renewed motion for summary judgment. Under the "law of the case" 
doctrine, the trial court should have refused to reconsider 
arguments already presented to and decided by that court. Salt 
Lake City Corp. v. James Constructors Inc., 761 P.2d 42 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1988). 
The public/private duty doctrine does not apply to this 
case. The doctrine is also known as the "duty to all - duty to no 
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one" doctrine. It provides for an injured person to recovery 
against a municipality, the injured person must, generally, show a 
breach of duty owed to him as an individual and not merely the 
breach of an obligation owed to the public generally. When 
immunity from suit is waived by statute, as it is in this case, the 
governmental entity is treated as an individual and the "public 
duty" doctrine does not apply. Adams v. State, 555 P. 2d 235 
(Alaska 1976). Further, the "public duty" doctrine directly 
conflicts with the Utah Governmental Immunity Act. The Utah 
legislature has specifically waived immunity from suit in this 
case. To adopt the "public duty" doctrine to shield the defendant 
from liability, when the Legislature has specifically abolished 
immunity in such cases, is the improper judicial repeal of a 
legislative act. Brennan v. Eugene, 285 Or. 401, 591 P.2d 719 
(1979). The "public duty" doctrine does not apply to a statute 
which is designed to benefit a particular and circumscribed class 
of persons within the general population. Baerlein v. State, 92 
Wash. 2d 229, 595 P.2d 930 (1979). Lamarr argues that the statutes 
allowing the City and UDOT to be sued for defective and dangerous 
conditions of state highways is a statute specifically designed to 
protect individuals like Lamarr, injured by the defective and 
unsafe condition of public highways and structures. That is a 
circumscribed group within the general population and, therefore, 
the "public duty" doctrine does not apply. Finally, the public 
duty doctrine does not apply to this case because the duty relied 
on by Lamarr is the City's nondelegable common law duty to all 
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users of the City's streets, to keep its streets in a reasonable 
safe condition. 
Proximate cause is a question of fact to be decided by 
the jury. Apache Tank Lines, Inc. v. Cheney, 706 P.2d 614 (Utah 
1985). The trial court improperly concluded, as a matter of law, 
that the conduct of the City and UDOT was not a proximate cause of 
the plaintiff's injuries. There may be more than one proximate 
cause of an injury. Hall v. Blackham, 18 Utah 2d 164, 417 P.2d 664 
(1966). An intervening negligent act, in this case, Cross being 
forced into the plaintiff, does not automatically become a 
superseding cause which relieves the original actor of liability. 
Godesky v. Provo City Corporation, 690 P.2d 541 (Utah 1984). These 
are jury questions. 
Police activities, specifically transient control in this 
case, are not immune discretionary functions under Utah Code Ann. 
§ 63-30-10(1)(a). The City's argument that this case involves 
"police activities" is inconsistent with the plaintiff's theory in 
this case. The plaintiff argues that the failure to control or 
otherwise manage the transient population under the North Temple 
Overpass made the Overpass defective and dangerous under Utah Code 
Ann. § 63-30-8 and Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-9. As such, immunity 
from suit has been waived. Where immunity from suit has been 
waived, "the discretionary function" exception of Utah Code Ann. § 
63-30-10(1)(a) cannot be used to modify or supersede that waiver of 
immunity. Sanford v. University of Utah, 26 Utah 2d 295 488 P.2d 
745 (1971). Finally, the City's failure to control or otherwise 
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manage the transients under the Overpass was a breach of its common 
law duty to all users of the Overpass and that duty cannot be 
avoided by alleging that transient control is discretionary. 
Schmeck v. City of Shawnee, 651 P.2d 585 (Kan. 1982). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE CITY'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON 
GENERAL DUTY WAS PREVIOUSLY DENIED BY THE 
TRIAL COURT AND WAS IMPROPERLY RECONSIDERED 
In its second summary judgment motion, dated August 10, 1990, 
the City argued that it has no general duty regarding the 
maintenance of signs or other pedestrian control markers on the 
Overpass because North Temple is a state highway under UDOT's 
jurisdiction. (R. 144-45). 
That identical argument was raised by the City back in June of 
1988 in a "Motion for Summary Judgment and for Rule 11 URCP 
Sanctions". In that initial motion, the City made the same 
argument it later raised, that it has no responsibility for North 
Temple and, therefore, has no duty to the plaintiff. (R. 16-18). 
In opposition to that initial motion and on appeal, Lamarr argues 
that state statutes assign responsibility to the City as well as to 
UDOT for the maintenance of pedestrian safety devices on and 
adjacent to state highways. (R. 37-42). Utah Code Ann. § 27-14-2, 
provides in part, as follows: 
The legislature recognizes that adequate 
sidewalks and pedestrian safety devices are 
essential to the general welfare of the 
citizens of the state. . . . The legislature 
deems it to be in the best interest of the 
state if pedestrian safety construction is to 
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be performed on state highways, that it be 
performed under the direction of the counties 
and participating cities pursuant to rules and 
regulations of the State Department of 
Transportation developed in cooperation with 
the counties and cities. 
Utah Code Ann. § 27-14-2 further explains the responsibilities of 
the City and UDOT regarding state highways as follows: 
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, 
counties and participating cities may 
construct and maintain curbs, gutters, 
sidewalk and pedestrian safety devices 
adjacent to the traveled portion of state 
highways upon easements that may be granted by 
the State Department of Transportation. The 
State Department of Transportation shall 
cooperate with counties and participating 
cities to accomplish pedestrian safety 
construction and maintenance. 
"Pedestrian safety devices" are defined in the statute to mean 
any device or method designed to foster the safety of pedestrian 
traffic. Utah Code Ann. § 27-14-3(4). The plaintiff has alleged 
in his complaint that the pedestrian safety devices on the Overpass 
were inadequate and were a proximate cause of his injuries. (R. 5) . 
In response to the City's first motion for summary judgment on 
this issue, the plctintiff argued that these statutes make it clear 
that the City and UDOT share responsibility for maintaining 
appropriate pedestrian safety devices on and adjacent to the 
Overpass and that jury should be allowed to determine the degree 
of responsibility to be allocated to each governmental entity. (R. 
39) . 
After reviewing the memoranda filed and hearing oral argument 
on these issues, the trial court denied the City's first Motion for 
Summary Judgment on that general duty issue. (R. 46-48). The 
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City's renewed August 10, 1990 motion was nothing more than an 
attempt to have the trial court reconsider its previous ruling on 
the identical issue. No new evidence was submitted by the City in 
support of that renewed motion. Under the "law of the case" 
doctrine, a trial court properly refuses to reconsider arguments 
already presented to and decided by that court. Salt Lake City 
Corp. v. James Constructors, Inc., 761 P.d 42 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
As stated in that case: 
The law of the case doctrine is particularly 
applicable when, in the case of summary 
judgment, a subsequent motion fails to present 
the case in a different light such as when no 
new material evidence is introduced. 
Id. at 45. 
Such was the case here. Granting summary judgment on the 
City's general duty to construct and/or maintain pedestrian safety 
devices was improper both substantively and procedurally. That 
issue should be remanded to the trial court for a jury's 
determination. 
POINT II 
THE PUBLIC DUTY DOCTRINE DOES NOT APPLY WHERE, 
AS HERE, IMMUNITY FROM SUIT HAS BEEN WAIVED BY 
STATUTE. EVEN IF APPLICABLE, THERE IS AN 
EXCEPTION TO THE PUBLIC DUTY DOCTRINE WHICH 
APPLIES TO THIS CASE. 
The City argues that it owes no private duty to the plaintiff 
for controlling the transient population under the Overpass. The 
City's argument is based on the "public duty" doctrine, also known 
as the "duty to all - duty to no-one" doctrine. That doctrine was 
addressed by this Court in Ferree v. State of Utah, 748 P.2d 147 
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(Utah 1989). The doctrine provides that in order for an injured 
person to recover against a municipality, he must generally show a 
breach of duty owed to him as an individual and not merely the 
breach of an obligation owed to the general public. 18 McQuillin, 
Municipal Corporations § 53.04(b) (3rd rev. ed. 1977). 
The public duty doctrine has no application where governmental 
immunity has specifically been waived by statute. The plaintiff's 
theory in this case is that the City's failure to control the 
transient population under the Overpass created a "defective, 
unsafe or dangerous condition" of a highway bridge, viaduct or 
other structure under Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-8 and created a 
"dangerous or defective condition" of a public structure under Utah 
Code Ann. § 63-30-9. Immunity from suit for that conduct is specif-
ically waived under those statutes. 
Utah Code Ann § 63-30-8 ("Section 8") provides: 
Immunity from suit of all governmental 
entities is waived for any injury caused by a 
defective, unsafe, or dangerous condition of 
any highway, road, street, alley, crosswalk, 
sidewalk, culvert, tunnel, bridge, viaduct, or 
other structure located thereon. 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-9, ("Section 9") provides: 
Immunity from suit of all governmental 
entities is waived for any injury caused from 
a dangerous or defective condition of any 
public building, structure, dam, reservoir or 
other public improvement. Immunity is not 
waived for latent defective conditions. 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-4 (Section 4") provides: 
Nothing contained in this act, unless 
specifically provided, is to be construed as 
an admission or denial of responsibility 
insofar as governmental entitles are 
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concerned. Wherein immunity from suit is 
waived by this act, consent to be sued is 
determined as if the entity were a private 
person. (Emphasis added.) 
Immunity from suit has been waived on the plaintiff's claims 
against the City under Section 8 and Section 9. Liability against 
the City must, therefore, be determined under Section 4 as if the 
City were a private person. The public duty defense is not 
available to an individual. That concept was explained by the 
Alaska Supreme Court in Adams v. State, 555 P.2d 235 (Alaska 1976). 
In Adams, the plaintiffs sued the state for failing to follow-up on 
fire hazard inspections: 
Thus, if the defendant were considered a 
private entity, its duty to the plaintiffs or 
their decedents would be clear. In fact, such 
a duty owed by a private investigator to those 
injured as a result of a negligent inspection 
has already been recognized. Hill v. USF&G, 
428 F.2d 112 (5th Cir. 1970). 
An application of the public duty doctrine 
here would result in finding no duty owed to 
the plaintiffs or their decedents by the 
State, because although they were foreseeable 
victims and a private defendant would have 
owed such a duty, no "special relationship" 
between the parties existed. Why should the 
establishment of duty become more difficult 
when the State is the defendant? Where there 
is no immunity, the State is to be treated 
like a private litigant. To allow the public 
duty doctrine to disturb this equality would 
create immunity where the legislature has not. 
(Emphasis added.) 
Id. at 2411-42. 
The "public duty" doctrine also directly conflicts with the 
Utah Governmental Immunity Act in this case. The common law public 
duty doctrine cannot stand in the face of legislation to the 
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contrary. As stated by this Court in Hansen v. Utah State 
Retirement Board, 652 P.2d 1332, 1337 (Utah 1982), Mof course, 
where a conflict arises between the common law and a statute or 
constitutional law, the common law must yield." As just mentioned, 
Sections 8 and 9 specifically waive immunity of the City in this 
case. For the trial court to conclude, as it did, that the City is 
immune from suit on a "public duty" defense is directly contrary to 
the legislative determination that the City's immunity in this case 
is waived. 
As stated by the Oregon Supreme Court, the "duty to all - duty 
to no one" doctrine is, in reality, a form of sovereign immunity. 
To adopt such a doctrine in a case where the? Legislature has 
abolished immunity is the improper judicial repeal of a legislative 
act. As explained in Brennen v. Eugene, 285 Or. 401, 591 P.2d 719, 
725 (1979): 
We conclude that any distinction between 
"public" and "private" duty is precluded by 
statute in this State, [citing Governmental 
Immunity Act]. . .In abolishing governmental 
tort immunity, the Legislature specifically 
provided for certain exceptions under which 
immunity would be retained, and we find no 
warrant for judicially engrafting an 
additional exception onto the statute. 
That position was further explained by the Arizona Court of 
Appeals in Bill Moore Motor Homes, Inc. v. State, 192 Ariz. 189, 
629 P.2d 1025, 1029 n.4 (1981): 
In our view, the dichotomy of public versus 
private duty has created more problems that it 
has solved . . . [w]e think that the public-
private duty dichotomy is a shield very much 
like the shield of governmental immunity. . . 
. It makes no difference whether we call the 
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remaining shield "no duty" or governmental 
immunity. 
For the reasons just mentioned, the public duty doctrine does 
not apply to this case. If this Court concludes, however, that the 
public duty doctrine applies to this case, there is an "exception" 
to the public duty doctrine which also applies. If a statute 
evidences a clear intent to identify and protect a particular and 
circumscribed class of persons within the general public, a tort 
action may be brought for the violation of that statute. Champagne 
v. Spokane Humane Society, 47 Wash. App. 887, 737 P.2d 1279 (1987). 
This "exception" to the public duty doctrine was explained in 
Baerlein v. State, 92 Wash.2d 229, 595 P.2d 930, 932 (1979): 
Obviously a statute which by its terms creates 
a duty to individuals can be the basis for 
negligence action where the statute is 
violated and the injured plaintiffs was one of 
the persons designed to be protected by the 
legislation. A clear statement of legislative 
intent to protect individuals does not need an 
"exception" to the traditional rule; it is 
simply a statutory duty imposed on the 
governmental entity . . . if the legislation 
evidences a clear intent to identify a 
particular and circumscribed class of persons, 
such person may bring an action in tort for 
violation of the statute or ordinance. 
This "exception" to the traditional "public duty" rule was 
accepted by this Court in Little v. Utah State Division of Family 
Services, 667 P.2d 49 (Utah 1983). In Little, the plaintiffs 
brought a wrongful death claim against the State for the death of 
their autistic infant daughter. The plaintiffs claimed that the 
State was negligent in failing to evaluate the foster home in which 
the infant was placed, failing to supervise the infant's placement 
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and failing to protect the infant from harm* In affirming judgment 
against the State, this Court held: 
The statute specifically includes a duty to 
protect the child . . . we therefore hold that 
the protection of law well extended to the 
interests the plaintiffs here seek to 
vindicate. 
Lamarr argues that Sections 8 and 9 of the Utah Governmental 
Immunity Act evidence an intent to protect a circumscribed group 
within the general population: those individuals injured by 
defective, unsafe or dangerous conditions of highways, public 
structures and their appurtenances. Where statutory language is 
plain and unambiguous, a court determining legislative intent will 
not look beyond the language of the statute to divine legislative 
intent. Brinkerhoff v. Forsyth, 779 P.2d 685 (Utah 1989). 
Sections 8 and 9 are unambiguous in waiving immunity from suit of 
governmental entities for any injury caused by dangerous, unsafe, 
or defective highways, sidewalks, bridges, viaducts and other 
public structures. The clear legislative intent is to allow those 
individuals injuresd by such dangerous, unsafe, or defective 
conditions to pursue claims against responsible governmental 
entities for those injuries. Those individuals are a circumscribed 
group within the general population. The public duty defense does 
not apply. 
Finally, Lamarr argues that the duty of the City which has 
been breached is its common law duty owed to all users of city 
streets to keep the streets reasonably safe for travel. This duty 
has been established by this Court in many cases. 
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A city is charged with a nondelegable duty to exercise due 
care in maintaining the streets and sidewalks within its corporate 
boundaries in a reasonably safe condition and may incur tort 
liability for that failure under Section 8. Bowen v. Riverton City, 
656 P.2d 434 (Utah 1982); Murray v. Oqden City, 548 P 2d, 896 
(Utah 1976). It is a primary duty of a city to exercise reasonable 
care to maintain its streets in reasonable safe condition and to 
guard against injury to individuals by removing or making 
reasonably safe any dangerous object in or on the streets. Morris 
v. Salt Lake City, 35 Utah 474, 101 P. 373 (1909). It is not 
necessary that the dangerous condition be an actual defect in the 
road surface or structure itself. "If the condition is such that 
it affects the street to the extent that it is not reasonably safe 
for its intended uses, a defective street condition exists." 
Grantham v. City of Topeka, 196 Kan. 393, 411 P.2d 634, 640 (1966). 
Lamarr argues that the transient population under the Overpass made 
the roadway and surrounding public structure unsafe for intended 
purposes. 
Police activity, like controlling transients, taken in 
isolation, may raise public duty arguments. However, when these 
same actions should be taken to comply with the City's duty to keep 
the streets safe, the public duty defense must fail. The best 
example of this argument is Lowman v. City of Mesa/ 125 Ariz. 590, 
611 P.2d 943 (1980) . 
In Lowman, the plaintiff sued the City of Mesa for personal 
injuries sustained when the plaintiff hit an unattended car on the 
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road. The plaintiff claimed the City was negligent for failing to 
remove the stalled car from the roadway. The sole issue on appeal 
was whether a municipality can be liable for its failure to remove 
a stalled vehicle from its streets. The City contended that "any 
duty to remove the stalled vehicle was one owed only to the public 
at large and not to any individual." ][d. at 945. After reviewing 
the history of the public duty doctrine, the Arizona Court of 
Appeals, reversing summary judgment for the City, concluded: 
In this case, the Mesa City Code §10-3-
29(A)(3) authorizes the city police to remove 
unattended vehicles the presence of which 
constitutes a hazard. Any duty of the police 
by virtue of the code to remove such a vehicle 
is one owed to the public generally and the 
failure of the police to remove a vehicle in 
violation of this duty would not ordinarily 
give rise to liability to a member of the 
public injured by the failure to remove it. 
However, the city has a common law duty owed 
to all users of city streets to keep them 
reasonably safe for travel and to warn the 
users of any actual dangers known to the city 
or which should be known to the city in the 
exercise of reasonable care. It is an alleged 
breach of this duty which appellant is 
entitled to have considered by the trier of 
fact. (Emphasis in original). 
As in Lgwman, the City in this case may be statutorily 
empowered to control transients. Lamarr's theory is that the 
City's failure to control the transient population made the 
Overpass unreasonably dangerous for travel. The City had knowledge 
of the problems created by the transient problem under the Overpass 
before Lamarr1s accident happened. (Deposition of Norman C. 
Thompson, pages 6-7). As such, the City breached its common law 
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duty owed to Lamarr and all city street users, regardless of any 
public duty doctrine. 
The trial court improperly granted the City's Motion for 
Summary Judgment on the public duty issue. 
POINT III 
PROXIMATE CAUSATION IS A QUESTION FOR THE JURY 
In its Supplemental Motion for Summary Judgment, UDOT joined 
the City on two grounds: 1) that UDOT's conduct was not a 
proximate cause of Lamarr's injuries, and 2) that highway 
maintenance is an immune discretionary function under Utah Code 
Ann. § 63-30-10(1)(a). The trial court concluded that highway 
maintenance is not an immune discretionary function under Utah Code 
Ann. § 63-30-10 (1) (a) , but concluded, as a matter of law, that 
UDOT's conduct was not a proximate cause of the plaintiff's 
injuries. Therefore, the only issue on appeal, as to UDOT, is 
whether UDOT's conduct in the construction, maintenance, and/or 
signing of the Overpass was not, as a matter of law, a proximate 
cause of Lamarr's injuries. Regardless of how this Court 
determines the other issues on appeal, this proximate cause issue 
must, therefore, be decided. 
The City and UDOT argued, and the trial court concluded, that 
they were entitled to summary judgment on proximate causation. The 
trial court's conclusion was error. This Court need give no 
deference to the trial court's legal conclusions. Such conclusions 
are reviewed de novo for legal correctness. Kelson v. Salt Lake 
County, 784 P.2d 1152 (Utah 1989). This Court has consistently 
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held that there may be more than one proximate cause of an injury. 
Jacques v. Farrimond, 14 Utah 2d 166, 380 P.2d 133 (1963); Hall v. 
Blackham, 18 Utah 2d 164, 417 P.2d 664 (1966). Proximate cause is 
a fact issue and will not, in most circumstances, be resolved as a 
matter of law. Apache Tank Lines, Inc. v. Cheney, 706 P.2d 614 
(Utah 1985). 
Causation issues similar to those of this case were addressed 
by this Court in Godesky v. Provo City Corporation, 690 P.2d 541, 
545 (Utah 1984): 
An intervening negligent act [Ainsworth 
hitting the plaintiff] does not automatically 
become a superseding cause that reliejves the 
original actor of liability. The earlier 
actor [City and UDOT] is charged with the 
foreseeable negligent acts of others. There-
fore, if the intervening negligence is 
foreseeable the earlier negligent act is a 
concurring cause, (inserts added). 
Foreseeability is based upon reasonableness. Schafer v. State 
Department of Institutions, 592 P.2d 493 (Mont. 1979). As such, it 
is a jury question. As explained by this Court in Rees v. 
Albertson's, Inc., 587 P.2d 130, 133 (Utah 1978): 
What is necessary to meet the test of 
negligence and proximate cause is that it be 
reasonable foreseeable, not that the 
particular accident would occur, but only that 
there is a likelihood of an occurrence of the 
same general nature. In that connection, it 
is to be had in mind that the jury is entitled 
to base its judgment not only upon the facts 
shown, but to indulge such reasonable 
inferences as may be fairly drawn therefrom. 
The City and UDOT argued in the trial court that it was 
unforeseeable that Ainsworth would turn into another car on the 
Overpass and force that car into Lamarr. The question is not 
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whether it was foreseeable that the plaintiff's friend Don 
Ainsworth would turn into another car on the Overpass (although 
Lamarr argues that such traffic accidents are foreseeable on any 
highway). The question, for causation purposes against the City 
and UDOT, is whether it was foreseeable that, because of the 
transient population under the Overpass and the lack of any signs 
prohibiting pedestrian traffic on the Overpass, a pedestrian, to 
avoid the transients, might be on the Overpass and get hit by a 
car. Lamarr argues that such an occurrence was foreseeable and 
that had proper steps been taken to clean up the transient 
situation and/or had proper signs prohibiting pedestrian traffic on 
the Overpass been posted, he would never have been on the Overpass 
and the accident wouldn't have happened. 
In the trial court, the City and UDOT cited Butterfield v. 
Okubo, 780 P.2d 94 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) to support a legal 
determination of causation. Butterfield is distinguishable. It 
was a medical malpractice case where "expert medical testimony must 
ordinarily be presented in order to establish . . . that the injury 
was proximately caused by conduct of the doctor." Jd. at 96-97. 
Without that expert testimony, the Utah Court of Appeals held in 
Butterfield that proximate cause had not been established as a 
matter of law. No such expert testimony is required to establish 
causation in this case. 
The City and UDOT are free to argue what they will to the jury 
regarding causation to minimize any allocation of fault 
attributable to each or both of them. That issue should not, 
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however, have been decided by the trial court as a matter of law. 
Proximate causation is a fact issue and should be remanded to the 
jury. Apache Tank Line, Inc. v. Cheney, 706 P.2d 614 (Utah 1985). 
POINT IV 
THE CITY'S DUTY TO CONTROL THE TRANSIENT 
POPULATION UNDER THE OVERPASS IS NOT AN IMMUNE 
DISCRETIONARY FUNCTION UNDER UTAH CODE ANN. § 
63-30-10(1) (a) . EVEN IF IT IS DISCRETIONARY, 
LAMARR IS FREE TO PURSUE THIS CLAIM AGAINST 
THE CITY 
Lamarr does not allege that his injuries arose from police 
activities, as those activities are defined by the City. The 
plaintiff filed this claim against the City, alleging negligent 
maintenance of traffic signs on the Overpass and negligent failure 
to control the transient problem under the Overpass. Both of these 
claims deal with the defective, unsafe, and/or dangerous condition 
of the Overpass. The City's immunity from suit is specifically 
waived under Utah Code Ann. S 63-30-8 and Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-9 
for any injury caused by that condition of the Overpass. 
Because immunity for the plaintiff's injuries has been 
statutorily waived under Sections 8 and 9, that immunity cannot be 
resurrected under the guise of the discretionary function exception 
of Utah Code Ann § 63-30-10 (1) (a) ("Section 10"). As stated by 
this Court in Sanford v. University of Utah 26 Utah 2d 285, 488 
P.2d 741, 745 (1971): 
Since the waiver of immunity in Sections 8 and 
9 encompasses a much broader field of tort 
liability than merely negligent conduct of 
employees within the scope of their employ-
ment, the legislature could not have intended 
that Sec. 10, including its exceptions, should 
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modify Sees. 8 and 9, even though it be 
conceded that the negligent conduct of an 
employee might be involved in an action for 
injuries caused by the creation or maintenance 
of a dangerous or defective condition. 
That reasoning was recently reaffirmed by this Court in Provo 
City Corp. v. State, 795 P.2d 1120, 1125 (Utah 1990): 
Nowhere in the act has the legislature given a 
broad category of activity an immunity that is 
not qualified by some other part of the act. 
See Sanford v. University of Utah, 26 Utah 2d 
285, 289, 488 P.2d 741, 745 (1971) (even the 
exceptions in §63-30-10 are subject to the 
other waivers) (emphasis added). 
Those decisions of this Court are why the City's discretionary 
function argument for "police work" must fail. Even assuming 
"police work" is involved in this case and that such activity is a 
discretionary function under Section 10, that conduct is actionable 
under the specific waiver of immunity in Sections 8 and 9, which 
overrides Section 10. 
Finally, the City cannot avoid its common law duty set out in 
Point II of this Brief by claiming that its action are 
discretionary. This was clearly stated by the Kansas Supreme Court 
in Schmeck v. City of Shawnee, 651 P.2d 585, 594 (Kan. 1982): 
A city's common law duty to keep its streets 
safe cannot be avoided by alleging the acts 
were discretionary. 
The trial court's conclusion that transient control is an 
immune discretionary function under Utah Code Ann § 63-30-10-(l)(a) 
was error. Even if discretionary, the City's actions are not 
immune because of the specific waiver of immunity of Section 8 and 
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Section 9, as well as the City's common law duty to Lamarr. This 
case should be remanded for trial on these issues. 
CONCLUSION 
Summary judgment on Lamarr's claims against the City and 
UDOT was improperly granted by the trial court on all issues raised 
on appeal. That summary judgment should be reversed and this case 
remanded to the trial court for a jury's determination of those 
issues. 
Dated this { ^ "' day of March, 1991 j£* 
GOICOECHEA LAW OFFICES - WEST VALLEY 
Attorneys for Appellant 
i^MTt^/y > 
N K. JENSEN 
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ADDENDUM 
APPENDIX A 
27-14-2, Purpose. The legislature recognizes that adequate sidewalks 
and pedestrian safety devices are essential to the general welfare of the 
citizens of the state. It is the 'opinion of the legislature that existing 
sidewalks within the state, especially in the most populated areas, are not 
adequate to service the walking public with a result of creating unneces-
sary hazards to pedestrian and vehicular traffic. It is the intent of this act 
to provide a means whereby a portion of the funds received by the counties 
and participating cities as B and C road funds may be used for the con-
struction of cqrbs, gutters, sidewalks and pedestrian safety devices pursu-
ant to the guidelines set forth in this act. The legislature deems it to be 
in the best interest of the state if pedestrian safety construction is to be 
performed on state highways that it be performed under the direction of 
the counties and participating cities pursuant to rules and regulations of 
the state Department of Transportation developed in cooperation with the 
counties and participating cities. It is the further intention of the legisla-
ture that the funds permitted to be expended*pursuant to this act be 
deemed additional to funds normally used by counties and participating 
cities for sidewalk construction and shall not be used in substitution for 
local sidewalk construction funds. 
HiKtory: C 19W, 27-14-2, enacU»d b\ L 
1975 (1st S S ),oh 3. §2 
27-14-4. Designated county and city sidewalks — Construction on 
easements granted by transportation department. (1) All sidewalks, 
including curbs and gutters within the unincorporated areas of a county 
and within nonparticipating cities or towns situated within the county, 
shall be designated county sidewalks. All sidewalks within participating 
cities shall be designated city sidewalks. 
(2) Notwithstanding any other provision of law counties and participa-
ting cities may construct and maintain curbs, gutters, sidewalks and pedes-
trian safety devices adjacent to the traveled portion of state highways 
upon easements that may be granted by the state Department of Transpor-
tation. The state Department of Transportation shall cooperate .with coun-
ties and participating cities to accomplish pedestrian safety construction 
and maintenance. 
History: C 1953, 27-U-4, enacted by L Crcwi-Reference.. 
19<,> < 1st S S ). ch 3, § 1 Transportation department, b3-49-l et se*j 
63-30-4. Act provisions not construed as admission or de-
nial of liability — Effect of waiver of immunity — 
Exclusive remedy — Joinder of employee — Lim-
itations on personal liability. 
(1) Nothing contained in this chapter, unless specifically provided, shall be 
construed as an admission or denial of liability or responsibility insofar as 
governmental entities or their employees are concerned. If immunity from 
suit is waived by this chapter, consent to be sued is granted and liability of the 
entity shall be determined as if the entity w^re a private person. 
(2) Nothing in this chapter shall be construed as adversely affecting any 
immunity from suit which a governmental entity or employee may otherwise 
assert under state or federal law. 
(3) The remedy against a governmental entity or its employee for an injury 
caused by an act or omission which occurs during the performance of such 
employee's duties, within the scope of employment, or under color of authority 
is, after the effective date of this act, exclusive of any other civil action or 
proceeding by reason of the same subject matter against the employee or the 
estate of the employee whose act or omission gave rise to the claim, unless the 
employee acted or failed to act through fraud or malice. 
(4) An employee may be joined in an action against a governmental entity 
in a representative capacity if the act or omission complained of is one for 
which the governmental entity may be liable, but no employee may be held 
personally liable for acts or omissions occurring during the performance of the 
employee's duties, within the scope of employment or under color of authority, 
unless it is established that the employee acted or failed to act due to fraud or 
malice. 
History: L. 1965, oh. 139, $ 4; 1978, ch. 27. 
4 3; 1983, ch. 129, 5 3. 
Amendment Notes. ~ The 1983 amend-
ment substituted "chapter" for "act", inserted 
"or their employees" i n Subsection (1). inserted 
Subsection (2), deleted "gross negligence" 
before "fraud" in Subsections (3) and <4), and 
made minor changes in phraseology and style 
Croaa-References. — Compromise and set-
tlement, 5 63-30-18 
Payment of medical and similar expense* 
not admissible to prove liability for injury, 
U R E . 409 
63-30-8- Waiver of immunity for injury caused by defec-
tive, Unsafe, or dangerous condition of highways, 
bridges, or other structures. 
Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is waived for any injury 
caused by a defective, unsafe, or dangerous condition of any highway, road, 
street, alley, crosswalk, sidewalk, culvert, tunnel, bridge, viaduct or other 
structure located thereon. 
63-30-9. Waiver of immunity for injury from dangerous or 
defective public building, structure, or other 
public improvement — Exception. 
Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is waived for any injury 
caused from a dangerous or defective condition of any public building, struc-
ture, dam, reservoir or other public improvement. Immunity is not waived for 
latent defective conditions. 
63-30-10. Waiver of immunity for injury caused by negli-
gent act or omission of employee — Exceptions — 
Waiver for injury caused by violation of fourth 
amendment rights. 
(1) Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is waived for injury 
proximately caused by a negligent act or omission of an employee committed 
within the scope of employment except if the injury: 
(a) arises out of the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or 
perform a discretionary function, whether or not the discretion is abused, 
or 
(b) arises out of assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, mali-
cious prosecution, intentional trespass, abuse of process, libel, slander, 
deceit, interference with contract rights, infliction of mental anguish, or 
civil rights; or 
(c) arises out of the issuance, denial, suspension, or revocation of, or by 
the failure or refusal to issue, deny, suspend, or revoke, any permit, li-
cense, certificate, approval, order, or similar authorization; or 
(d) arises out of a failure to make an inspection, or by reason of making 
an inadequate or negligent inspection of any property; or 
(e) arises out of the institution or prosecution of any judicial or admin-
istrative proceeding, even if malicious or without probable cause; or 
(f) arises out of a misrepresentation by the employee whether or not it 
is negligent or intentional; or 
(g) arises out of or results from riots, unlawful assemblies, public dem-
onstrations, mob violence, and civil disturbances; or 
(h) arises out of or in connection with the collection of and assessment 
of taxes; or 
(i) arises out of the activities of the Utah National Guard, or 
(j) arises out of the incarceration of any person in any state prison, 
county, or city jail or other place of legal confinement, or 
(k) arises from any natural condition on state lands or the result of any 
activity authorized by the State Land Board; or 
(1) arises out of the activities of providing emergency medical assis-
tance,' fighting fire, handling hazardous materials, or emergency evacua-
tions. 
(2) Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is waived for injury 
proximately caused or.arising out of a violation of protected fourth amend-
ment rights as provided in Chapter 16, Title 78 which shall he the exclusive 
remedy for injuries to those protected rights. If § 78-16-5 or Subsection 
77-35-12(g) or any parts thereof are held invalid or unconstitutional, this 
Subsection (2) shall be void and governmental entities shall remain immune 
from suit for violations of fourth amendment rights 
APPENDIX B 
7" •«»-; j*j'_v"c;;"!i Distr ict 
DEC 0 7 1990 
GORDON K. JENSEN - 4 ! : 1 
GOICOECHEA LAW OFFICE - WEST VALLEY 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
The Harmon Building 
3540 South 4000 West, Suite ID I) 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84 120 
(801) 964-822H 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT IN H 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, S' 
NICHOLAS r.-AMARR, 
Plaintiff, 
U T A H S T A T E DEPARTMENT 
TRANSPORTATION, and 
SALT .LAKE CITY, 
Defender.* » 
Salt Lake* 
ORDER OF DISMISSAL 
J udge Homer F. Wilkinson 
i*> t^ndanf s 
S t a t e Department <: T : a n s p o r t a t ^ : n 
. v Gordo 
P r *» » -
Jen 
J * K^. . . L 
v f e n d a n t 
e n a a n t 
e r r ° V K « . 
r e a r i n g t i e a r ^ m e n t -
: r l r . ^ed summai . 
^ * y >i.-\si n n r i T «: - ; t h e h e a i i n o 
p;r s o a r e d r ; ;;^t ^ . - t - ,,• onw - *" *=>d 
cj r o u n d s . ;ie L . ^ * : : 
; wa - . e ^ i • - s e a t e d 
i.5 r e p r e s e n t e d c y 
i 
.e : . ^ e d memoranda and 
. * . r >>- 4 i T ' f , 
ni ke 
•rcie- : . ismissi- was 
"-"': - - La±ntif f 
r.. ,. several 
objections t * tne proposed 
Order of Dismissal were granted by the Court in a Minute Entry 
received by the plaintiff on November 5, 1990. 
Based on that Minute Entry, the pleadings on file, the 
arguments of counsel, and for good cause appearing, the Court 
enters the following Order pursuant to Rule 52(a) of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure: 
The Court concludes that the defendant Salt Lake City owed 
no general duty to the plaintiff for the construction, 
maintenance or signing of the North Temple Overpass; 
The Court concludes that the defendant Salt Lake City owed 
no private duty to the plaintiff for controlling the transient 
population under the North Temple Overpass; 
The Court concludes that the conduct of the defendants 
Salt Lake City and UDOT was not a proximate cause of the 
plaintiff•s injuries; 
The Court concludes that any duty of the defendant Salt 
Lake City to control the transient population under the North 
Temple Overpass is an immune discretionary function under Utah 
Code Ann. §63-30-10(a); 
The Court concludes that the construction,, maintenance and 
signing of the North Temple Overpass is not an immune 
discretionary function under Utah Code Ann. §63-30-10(a). 
Based on these Conclusions of Law, the Court orders as 
follows: 
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M O T I O N F O R S U M M A R Y J U D G M E N T 
THE COURT: The matter before the Court is the 
5 case of Nicholas LaMarr versus Utah State Department of 
6 Transportation and Salt Lake City. This comes before 
7 the Court on the defendants' Motion for Summary 
8 Judgment. 
9 MR. HAWKINS: Greg R. Hawkins for Salt Lake 
10 City, your Honor. 
11 MR. BURNETT: Brent Burnett, Assistant 
12 Attorney General, for the Utah State Department of 
13 Transportation, your Honor. 
14 MR. JENSEN: Gordon Jensen for the plaintiff. 
15 THE COURT: You may proceed. 
16 MR. HAWKINS: All right. 
17 Basically the simple facts in this matter, as 
18 alleged in the plaintiff's Complaint, are that their 
19 client walked along and crossed the North Temple 
20 overpass and ran into some transients, and went to 
21 lunch. And when he came back, rather than walk along 
22 the sidewalk, the appurtenant sidewalk that's 
23 constructed on the overpass on the south side of it, 
24 their claim is, rather than run into the transients 
25 again, he walked along North Temple. And as he was 
1 walking along North Temple, somebody spotted him, pulled 
2 to the right, and forced another car into him and struck 
3 him and knocked him off the side of the North Temple 
4 overpass, just knocked him off the overpass. He was 
5 walking on the roadway as opposed to the sidewalk. 
6 Salt Lake City made a Motion for Summary 
7 Judgment. We made one a couple of years ago based on 
8 the fact that this was a State-owned road. Mr. Jensen 
9 had opposed that. And the Court at that time said, 
10 based on the status of the file, you were not going to 
11 grant our Motion for Summary Judgment. 
12 Since then the discovery has been done. And 
13 the State has admitted, Yes, that's a State road as 
14 contained in the State law; and yes, we do have all the 
15 maintenance on the road -- the point being Salt Lake 
16 City has absolutely no control over that road in any 
17 sense of the word. But more particularly, what the 
18 current Motion for Summary Judgment is based upon is 
19 that Salt Lake City owed no duty to the plaintiff, 
20 either for the maintenance of the roadway or for failing 
21 to take care of the transient population. 
22 Now, with regard to the maintenance of the 
23 roadway, that's done by the State. We have several 
24 State laws, 27-12-21, that says, Class A roads are State 
25 roads. The State has jurisdiction and control. 
1 27-12-86, which specifically says that the commission 
2 has complete jurisdiction and control over the entire 
3 right-of-way over State roads in the cities. And 
4 27-12-88, Utah Code Annotated, where it says, where 
5 there is no curb, the commission has control over the 
6 traveled way, contiguous shoulders and appurtenances. 
7 In this case there is no curb. It's a 
8 viaduct with a sidewalk attached alongside the viaduct 
9 that rises up and runs just to the south of the 
10 roadway. 
11 I assume the Court has read the briefs, so I 
12 am not going to address the Issues other than to note 
13 that it's a discretionary duty. I understand the case I 
14 have cited, that the Supreme Court has granted 
15 certiorari on that issue. But we think it's appropriate 
16 law and good law and in accordance with the way the 
17 courts have been ruling in the past with regard to road 
18 maintenance. 
19 I wish to call the attention of the Court to 
20 the case of Gillman v. Department of Financial 
2 1
 Institutions in the State of Utah, which is 782 P.2d 
22 506. It's cited in the brief. But the language I 
23 specifically want to call the attention of the Court on 
24 is starting on page 512 the Utah Supreme Court said that 
25 discretionary Immunity is an appropriate immunity, and 
4 
1 then proceeded to quote the California Law Revision 
2 Commission and it says, 
3 "The California Law Revision Commission 
4 aptly recognizes this fact in recommending a 
5 similar immunity. 'Public entities and 
6 public employees should not be liable for 
7 failure to make arrests or otherwise enforce 
8 any law. They should not be liable for 
9 failing to inspect persons or property 
10 adequately to determine compliance with 
11 health and safety. . . '" 
12 And then they go through with all these 
13 various things. 
14 "The government has undertaken these 
15 activities to insure the public health and 
16 safety, to provide the utmost public 
17 protection. Governmental entities should 
18 not be dissuaded from engaging in such 
19 activities by the fear that liability be 
20 imposed if an employee performs his duties 
21 inadequately. Moreover, if the risk 
22 exposure to which a public entity would be 
23 subject would include virtually all 
24 activities going on within the community, 
25 there would be potential for building 
1 defects, for all crimes, and for all 
2 outbreaks of contagious disease. No private 
3 person is subject to risks of this 
4 magnitude." And the Court proceeded to say, 
5 "We just do not have liability for those 
6 issues." 
7 I have attached a copy of the Ferree v. 
8
 State to the Court. I think that is -- again, it's 
9 Supreme Court law -- it's a very good law. And they are 
10 re-emphasizing the fact that the plaintiff must show a 
11 duty, a specific duty to the plaintiff as opposed to the 
12 public duty. And it's cited in the brief. 
13 I cited the two cases dealing with the deputy 
14 sheriff' cases that have come up in which the court has 
15 specifically held that the sheriff has no specific duty 
16 to the individual, and therefore there is no liability. 
17 One was for, I think, a burglary case. And the other 
18 one, they had pulled an individual over who had been 
19 drinking and let him go and he eventually killed 
20 himself. And the Court said there is no liability. All 
21 the police function is is a general duty. 
22 I point out to you that the issue of 
23 transients happens to be a nationwide concern; it is not 
24 just local. And the Supreme Court has placed limits on 
25 us. We cannot throw a person in jail simply because of 
6 
their status. 
2 I And secondly, I think the Court can take 
3 judicial notice of the fact that the jails are so 
4 doggone full, we don't put people in jail for 
5 misdemeanors anymore. They have to be fairly serious 
6 crimes before the jail will even take them. Thank you. 
7 MR. BURNETT: Your Honor, first may I inquire 
8 on the Court, would the Court want to hear both motions, 
9 and the motion in which we joined with the city? We 
10 have a second motion. 
11 THE COURT: I am inclined to say, argue them 
12 both and then let everybody respond. 
13 But any problem with that? 
14 MR. JENSEN: We are obviously going to argue 
15 them both today. I was thinking --
16 THE COURT: I don't care. If you have a 
17 preference, say so. 
18 MR. JENSEN: I would just as soon address this 
19 motion with Salt Lake City at the point that UDOT•s 
20 joining in, address that, and then go on to the separate 
21 notice of claim issue. 
22 THE COURT: Okay. That makes no difference to 
23 me. 
24 MR. BURNETT: As I say, the Court's preference 
25 guide my actions. 
1 I THE COURT: He expressed a preference. 
2 I MR. BURNETT: Certainly, your Honor. 
3 As to the motion we joined in, the facts 
4 aren't in dispute. The plaintiff was aware of a walkway 
5 that was over part of the North Temple overpass. He 
6 used it going in one direction. Concerned over 
7 transients gathering where that walkway reached ground 
8 on the west said made him then not use the safe walkway 
9 provided by the State and designed into the bridge, but 
10 instead he walked against traffic. A friend or 
11 acquaintance, seeing him walking, tried to pull over 
12 towards him, but instead ended up forcing a car in the 
13 far lane into the plaintiff. 
14 Your Honor, there can be no proximate cause 
15 here. We have not been negligent. We provided a safe 
16 access route. The question of illegal transients does 
17 not impact on UDOT. Even if the Court were to rule that 
18 there were a duty to protect against transients, that 
19 would not be the Department of Transportation. 
20 It is not a question that maybe he didn't 
21 know about the walkway, which would preclude him from 
22 having to walk in the traveled lane. It is clear from 
23 the facts in the Complaint he was aware of that walkway 
24 and consciously chose to disregard it. The proximate 
25 and sole cause of this accident was the acquaintance 
8 
1 I pulling out in front of the other vehicle and causing 
2 I the vehicle to strike the plaintiff who was in the 
3 I roadway rather than taking the pedestrian walkway which 
4 was available. 
5 Also the question of putting up extra signs 
6 saying, Please do not use this; use the walkway you are 
7 aware of, or such, is all questions of discretionary 
8 function, your Honor. While Duncan has a writ granted 
9 for certiorari, we feel that the statement in Duncan 
10 by the Court of Appeals still is applicable law. It is 
11 a restatement of what other courts have said, saying 
12 that, 
13 "Highway maintenance and improvements 
14 is predominantly fiscal matters. Every 
15 highway could probably be made safer by 
16 further expenditures but we will not hold 
17 UDOT (and implicitly the legislature) 
18 negligent for having to strike a difficult 
19 balance between the need for greater safety 
20 and the burden of funding improvements." 
2 1 Yes, maybe we could have bought land, 
22 condemned extra property, put a second walkway in. The 
23 decision was made to put in the current walkway. It was 
24 available. He used it in one direction. Under the 
25 discretionary function under the question of proximate 
cause, there was no negligence, no liability of the 
Department of Transportation for this accident, your 
Honor . 
THE COURT: I think you concede first that it 
is a State road? 
MR. BURNETT: Certainly it's a State road. 
THE COURT: Do you concede that the State has 
that responsibility or does the City have that jointly? 
MR. BURNETT: Your Honor, for maintenance 
purposes, it is a State road. And the maintenance of 
the road, it is not the duty of the City. In fact, I 
would agree with the City that it does not have the duty 
to sign or maintain the road. 
THE COURT: So the State has that 
responsibility? 
MR. BURNETT: That is the State 
responsibility. And if the Court were to deny the 
motions, then I believe the State and the City would be 
appropriate parties to answer for any alleged negligence 
to design and maintenance. 
There is not a question of maintenance; it is 
not a question of failure to maintain. It is a question 
of failure to design or somehow put signs or further 
appurtenances or failure to make a second safe route for 
the plaintiff after he felt unsure of himself going 
10 
1 I through the transients to use the walkway that was put 
2 | there for pedestrian traffic. 
3 I THE COURT: Of course I ask this question, and 
4 I know what your answer is going to be, but when you say 
5 -- use the term "discretionary function" as far as the 
6 State is concerned and the duty that either they have to 
7 the plaintiff himself, is the question of proximate 
8 cause a question for a jury or a question for this Court 
9 to decide? 
10 MR. BURNETT: In this case, your Honor, it is 
11 not a question for the jury, because as a matter of law 
12 there is no question that the only sole cause would be 
13 the plaintiff placing himself there when he knew there 
14 was a pedestrian sidewalk available, and the actions of 
15 a third person who caused the accident in what otherwise 
16 would not have happened. That, no, your Honor, we feel 
17 that is a matter of law. It is not a question for the 
18 jury. 
19 As a duty, it is a legal question. Is there 
20 a duty to a pedestrian who does not take the pedestrian 
21 walkway provided but walks in the traveled portion of 
22 the road and is struck by the vehicle, is there a duty 
23 to that person by the entity that has created the 
24 pedestrian walkway? 
25 There is no duty obviously for the Department 
1 1 
1 of Transportation to be involved in transient removal. 
2 They have no jurisdiction. That is city property as far 
3 I as the handling of transients. 
4 The duty of the Department of Transportation 
5 would be met by providing a safe pedestrian walkway --• 
6 safe not from transients or theft, but safe as far as a 
7 walkway where they can travel as opposed to vehicle 
8 travel. That was done in this case. It was not 
9 disputed. It was a walkway. The only question is, the 
10 plaintiff consciously chose not to use that walkway. 
11 THE COURT: Thank you, counsel. 
12 MR. JENSEN: Gordon Jensen for the plaintiff. 
13 The facts of this case are correctly stated: 
14 That he did go over the walkway which extends halfway 
15 over the North Temple overpass. Then there is a 
16 stairway that drops pedestrians right underneath the 
17 North Temple overpass, right in the heart of the 
18 transient population under the overpass. It is not a 
19 question of a walkway that extends all the way over and 
20 somebody can go over and back along the overpass on a 
21 pedestrian walkway. It goes halfway over and drops 
22 people down. 
23 What happened on this day is the plaintiff 
24 gets on the pedestrian walkway and is dropped down into 
25 the middle of a bunch of transients who start harassing 
12 
1 him and bugging him and asking for money and pushing him 
2 around. And he leaves and gets something to eat and 
3 comes back. And he has to get back over to the hotel he 
4 was staying at. He was from out of state. 
5 He was not going to go back into the area he 
6 had to use to get into the pedestrian walkway, which was 
7 to go back into the heart of where the transients were 
8 under the middle of the stairs. He saw no signs 
9 prohibiting or excluding pedestrians on the overpass. 
10 So he took the appropriate side of the road and started 
11 walking over the overpass. He was hit by the car and 
12 was hit to the ground below. 
13 Those are the facts of the accident. And the 
14 argument that we make is, there may very well oe a 
15 number of proximate causes to this accident. First of 
16 all, I'll argue in order: The general duty alleged, the 
17 private duty distinction of the causation issues, and 
18 the discretionary function. I'll try and do that pretty 
19 quickly. 
20 The general duty of UDOT and Salt Lake City 
21 for pedestrian markers and traffic control devices or 
22 signs on the overpass was addressed by this Court early 
23 on in this proceeding. Back in June of 1988 Salt Lake 
24 City filed the same motion they filed here. We don't 
25 have any jurisdiction. They cited the code. North 
13 
1 Temple is a State road. 
2 The plaintiff's argument, and the plaintiff's 
3 argument was then and it is now, under the statutes of 
4 the State, particularly the one cited in the brief 
5 entitled 27 specifically dealing with pedestrian safety 
6 devices and who has authority or joint authority to 
7 place pedestrian safety devices on roadways is shared 
8 jointly between UDOT and the participating cities. 
9 That's Utah Code Annotated 27-14-2 and 27-14-4. 
10 Our position, as it was at that time, is that 
11 the plaintiff is not willing to be governed and I am not 
12 willing to be governed by Mr. Burnett's concession that 
13 North Temple is a State highway. We have to concede 
14 that also. Our position is even conceding that North 
15 Temple is State maintained. 
16 These particular statutes as far as safety 
17 control devices talk about that this pedestrian safety 
18 construction and safety devices are to be performed 
19 under the directions of the counties and participating 
20 cities pursuant to rules and regulations of UDOT; that 
21 UDOT and the participating cities are to cooperate to 
22 accomplish pedestrian safety construction and 
23 maintenance. 
24 Our argument was at that time and is now 
25 that that Motion for Summary Judgment was decided early 
14 
1 on in this case and is the law in this case. There have 
2 been no new issues raised. Although we are further 
3 along in discovery, there is nothing new offered by Salt 
4 Lake City other than their first argument, It's under 
5 UDOT's jurisdiction; we don't have anything to do with 
6 it. 
7 We addressed those issues and still present 
8 the same argument here and say that, under the law of 
9 the case doctrine, that issue was decided and shouldn't 
10 be decided again. That part of the Motion for Summary 
11 Judgment should be denied as it's already ruled on by 
12 the Court. 
13 The public/private duty argument very simply 
14 is that the plaintiff cannot establish a duty owed to 
15 him individually in this case; therefore, the 
16 governmental entity does not have any duty to him, and 
17 we can't present a prima facie negligence case against 
18 them. The distinction is that the public/private duty 
19 argument does then apply where there has been a specific 
20 waiver of immunity in a governmental immunity statute. 
2 1 And here is how the reasoning goes. 
22 This immunity of a governmental entity is 
23 waived for the defective, unsafe condition of a highway, 
24 viaduct, overpass, bridge -- like in this case. 
25 Governmental immunity is also specifically waived, 
15 
1 meaning you can pursue a claim against these 
2 governmental entities, for unsafe or dangerous nature of 
3 the structure. We are arguing that it is both a highway 
4 viaduct, appurtenance and public structure, that, and 
5 under 63-30-8 and 63-30-9 governmental immunity has 
6 specifically been waived. 
7 The Governmental Immunity Act states that 
8 when immunity is waived, as in this case, that consent 
9 to be sued is determined as if the entity were a private 
10 person. Courts who have addressed the public/private 
11 duty distinction where governmental immunity has been 
12 waived have held that the public or the private duty or 
13 private duty defense does not apply, 
14 It is pretty clearly stated in the case in 
15 the order of the Supreme Court, the case from Brennen 
16 v. Eugene cited in the brief. 
17 "We conclude that any distinction 
18 between 'public1 and 'private1 duty is 
19 precluded by statute in this State." Then 
20 they cite the Governmental Immunity Act. 
21 "In abolishing governmental tort 
22 I immunity, the Legislature specifically 
23 provided for certain exceptions under which 
24 I immunity would be retained, and we find no 
25 warrant for judicially engrafting an 
16 
1 additional exception onto the statute." 
2 In essence, what happened is the legislature 
3 stepped in and said that, In certain cases we are going 
4 to let you sue a governmental entity for a dangerous 
5 condition of a highway overpass or public structure. To 
6 step in with a common law duty doctrine and say, We 
7 think we are now going to say that, although the 
8 legislature says you are immune, we are going to kind of 
9 say you are immune under the public duty doctrine is to 
10 judicially appeal the legislative waiver of immunity and 
11 say, You are immune; now, we are going to let you sue. 
12 I As the cases cited say, that really the 
13 public duty doctrine is nothing more than another way of 
14 claiming governmental immunity. It says here that in 
15 the Arizona Court of Appeals they are saying, 
16 "The dichotomy of public versus private 
17 duty has created more problems than it 
18 solved.,. It's a shield very much like the 
19 shield of governmental immunity... And it 
20 makes no difference whether we call the 
21 remaining shield 'no duty' or governmental 
22 immunity." 
23 So we have the legislature saying, You can 
24 sue these people for the dangerous and defective nature 
25 J of the overpass. Then we have them coming back in and 
17 
1 saying, Understand, we are going to basically appeal 
2 what the legislature has said and say, You are immune 
3 anyway. And that's where the problem arises. 
4 It's the plaintiff's position that in a 
5 situation where immunity has specifically been waived by 
6 the legislature, where they have said, Under these given 
7 circumstances you can sue the government here, that duty 
8 is to be determined as if the governmental entity is an 
9 individual. Public duty does not apply to individuals, 
10 and it would be a repeal basically by the judiciary of 
11 the immunity that the legislature has already laid down 
12 for this particular case. 
13 There is also one other exception to the 
14 public duty doctrine. Even if this Court holds that the 
15 public duty defense does apply here, and that is where 
16 the statute is specifically designed to protect a 
17 circumscribed group of people within the general 
18 population, public duty doesn't apply. And that's been 
19 acknowledged by the Utah Supreme Court in the Little 
20 case. 
21 It's the plaintiff's position that the 
22 statute which allows individuals to pursue claims 
23 against the government for dangerous and defective 
24 highway overpasses, viaducts and bridges is a statute 
25 designed to protect a circumscribed group of people 
18 
1 within the general population. Those few people injured 
2 by the defective and dangerous condition of highways and 
3 other public buildings, that is wnat that statute and 
4 who that statute was designed to protect. And 
5 therefore even if a public duty did exist in this case, 
6 there is an exception because this statute was 
7 specifically designed to protect that group of people 
8 within the general population. 
9 So our argument on duty is that the general 
10 duty does not apply because that's already been decided 
11 on by the Court on the previous Motion for Summary 
12 Judgment. And it's for the jury to determine, based on 
13 the statutes, who has responsibility there, because the 
14 statutes lay on both part ies is our position. 
15 On the private duty issue, that private duty 
16 doesn't apply where the statute specifically waived 
17 immunity. Even if it is a public duty issue, there is 
18 an exception because th*s statute is designed to protect 
19 this group of individuals And Nick LaMarr, the 
20 plaintiff in this < ase, is a member of that specified 
21 group of people to be protected by that statute. 
22 On the prnxlmate cause issue -- I'll be brief 
23 here -- it's like UDOT and the City are arguing, that 
24 there can only be one proximate cause to an accident. 
25 And it's not true. Our position is that, obviously the 
19 
1 guy who drove in and knocked the plaintiff over off the 
2 overpass is negligent. And we believe they can argue to 
3 I the jury all they want that, This negligence kind of 
4 intervened into our conduct and we are not responsible. 
5 Our position is that Nick LaMarr never would 
6 have been on the overpass if these defendants had 
7 fulfilled their duty and obligation to the plaintiff by 
8 properly marking the overpass to exclude pedestrian 
9 traffic, which it didn't do, and by clearing up the 
10 transient population under the overpass where he would 
11 have been able to go back and get back up on the 
12 pedestrian walkway but didn't. 
13 As stated by the Utah Supreme Court in the 
14 Godesky case, it's a question of foreseeabi1Ity. 
15 "The intervening act" -- which is the 
16 car hitting the plaintiff and knocking him 
17 off the overpass -- "does not automatically 
18 become a superseding cause that relieves the 
19 original actor of liability. The earlier 
20 actor" -- our argument is the failure of the 
21 City and UDOT to properly mark and control 
22 the transients -- "is charged with the 
23 foreseeable negligent acts of others. 
24 Therefore, if the intervening negligence is 
25 foreseeable, the earlier negligent act is a 
20 
1 concurring cause." 
2 Our argument is traffic accidents on highways 
3 are foreseeable, particularly knowing the transient 
4 problem. And particularly it would I" foreseeable that 
5 someone would get up on the overpass and get hit. 
6 Proximate cause is an issue for the jury. 
7 The Butterfield case that was cited as 
8 supporting a legal determination of proximate cause was 
9 a medical malpractice case where the court determined 
10 that expert testimony was necessary to establish 
11 causation. And because the affidavit submitted wasn't 
12 sufficient to establish medical causation, they could 
13 rule as a matter of law that there was no connection, no 
14 causal connection between the alleged malpractice and 
15 the injury to the plaintiff. That's not the case here. 
16 Wh11P there may be expert testimony necessary 
17 to establish liability In this case, or duty, or what 
18 they sh-mM have* done, to establish causation as to 
19 whether their actions contributed to the plaintiff's 
20 injuries is not a matter that requires any expert 
21 testimony. Proximate cause being a jury issue, this 
22 MOT ion fur "Mimmary Judgment should be denied. 
23 And the final thing — I'll be brief -- is on 
24 the disc retionary function. The Utah Supreme Court has 
25 said again and again that marking and signing of a 
2 1 
1 highway is a governmental function, but it is not a 
2 discretionary function within 63-30-10 of the 
3 Governmental Immunity Act. I think it was best stated 
4 by the Utah Supreme Court in Richards v. Leavitt. 
5 "The maintenance and repair of traffic 
6 signs is a governmental function for which 
7 immunity from suit has been expressly waived 
8 and which is not within the discretionary 
9 function exception." 
10 Now, the Duncan case and Gleave case on 
11 railroad crossings and UDOTfs responsibilities at 
12 railroad crossings, we submit they are distinguishable. 
13 They are different cases. The cases that deal 
14 specifically with highways say, It is not within the 
15 discretionary function exception. 
16 Finally, as far as the police activity goes, 
17 the plaintiff doesn't argue that his injuries were 
18 caused by the kind of police activities that the City 
19 alleges, really failure to arrest or letting go a parole 
20 person or something. What our argument is simply was 
21 that the City was negligent in allowing the transients 
22 to continue to congregate under the overpass, and that 
23 created a defective and dangerous condition of a public 
24 structure. That is our claim of negligence. 
25 Only after we asked them to identify who can 
22 
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testify, who has knowledge about the transient problem, 
they identified some police officers. That's the first 
time the police department got involved. They have 
officers or the people with knowledge of that problem. 
An . «-* ins within the department, the police have the 
responsibility for monitoring that situation. 
Our position is that under the express waiver 
of immunity of 63-30-8 and -9, we pursue this claim. 
And discretionary function of 63-30-10 cannot be used to 
override the specific waiver of immunity of 63-30-7 and 
-8 and -9 . 
The last quote is Sanford v. University of 
Utah. 
"Since the niver of immunity in 
Sections 8 and 9 encompasses a much broader 
fie-iJ ut tort liability than merely 
negligent conduct of employees within the 
scope of th*Mi employment, the Legislature 
could not have intended Section 10" -- the 
discretionary function section -- "including 
its exceptions, should modify Sections 8 and 
9, even though it be conceded that the 
negligent conduct of an employee might be 
involved in an action for injuries caused by 
the creation or maintenance of a dangerous 
23 
or defective condition." 
2 I The bottom line being where the legislature 
3 has specifically waived immunity for defective and 
4 dangerous condition of a public highway, that discretion 
5 of a discretionary function cannot be used to override 
6 that specific waiver of immunity. That is what the 
7 Stanford court is saying. 
8 Based on all of those arguments, it's our 
9 position that all points in Salt Lake City's Motion for 
10 Summary Judgment regarding general duty, private duty, 
11 causation and discretionary function for both highway 
12 maintenance and police activity have to be denied. 
13 THE COURT: What will you be doing with the 
14 Ferree case? 
15 MR. JENSEN: Well, as I said, I believe the 
16 Ferree case acknowledges that you establish a private 
17 duty. Iffs our position that the discretionary function 
18 exclusions, number one, that the Governmental Immunity 
19 Act applies, and there has been a specific waiver of 
20 immunity as there has been in this case, as specific to 
21 Section 63-30-8 and -9. It's my understanding that 
22 those specific waivers of immunity were not raised in 
23 the Ferree case. Where there is a specific waiver of 
24 immunity that the legislature has put into the statute, 
25 that the private duty distinction does not apply as it 
24 
does in this case. 
THE COURT: Thanks. 
3 ] MR. HAWKINS: Your Honor, very briefly. 
4 I think a check if the minute entry in the 
5 file shows that the Court's intent was to do that 
6 without prejudice, because your minute entry says, 
7 "Based on the state of the file at this time." But in 
8 any event, I will call your attention to page 152 of the 
9 Ferree case in which the Supreme Court said, quote — 
10 talking about SMVPreign immunity in Section III of the 
11 opinion. It says, 
12 "Having decided that the defendants 
13 owed no duty of care towards the victim, we 
14 neec t reach the questions raised by the 
15 doctrine of sovereign immi ty. Some 
16 courts, including this Court, have addressed 
17 the liability ot a corrections department 
18 solely on the question of sovereign 
19 immunity. 
20 "Sovereign immunity, however" -- going 
2 1 - t o page 153 -- "is an affirmative defense 
22 and conceptually arises subsequent to the 
23 question of whether t here j , tort liability 
24 in the first instance There is sound 
25 reason and desirable simplicity in analyzing 
25 
1 and applying negligence concepts before 
2 deciding issues of sovereign immunity." 
3 Then it quotes the Supreme Court of 
4 California, who happens to quote Professor Van Alstyne. 
5 "Some cases represent an unnecessary 
6 effort to categorize the acts or omissions 
7 in question as immune discretionary 
8 functions, when the same result could be 
9 reached on the ground that the facts fail to 
10 show the existence of any duty owed to the 
1 1 plaintiff." 
12 Specifically the Supreme Court has said in 
13 our State when you first look at whether or not there is 
14 a duty before you ever look at whether or not there has 
15 been any waiver of sovereign immunity, that's what 
16 Ferree spec if leally says. So as far as they're 
17 concerned, governmental immunity is not a judicial 
18 waiver of immunity. The courts are saying you have to 
19 look at a specific duty first. 
20 It!s not a novel concept. It's one of these 
21 things where I suppose, because of governmental 
22 immunity, the growth of common law and definition of 
23 duties has been stunted. And now with the waiver of 
24 governmental immunity, the courts are beginning to look 
25 at things. And everybody is saying, Oh, waiver of 
26 
1 governmental immunity; the government has to pay now. 
2 And the court says, Wait a minute; you look at duty. 
3 You first have to find a specific duty. 
4 Beach v. University of Utah, the case where 
5 the student from the University of Utah is on a field 
6 trip and ends up being found dead in the morning. And 
7 they are saying, Hey, so she drank a lot of alcohol. 
8 And the Court said there is no specific duties that the 
9 University of Utah owed to that student who was on a 
10 mandatory field trip in order to get credit for that 
11 class. You know, to me, how much closer to a specific 
12 duty can you get? And yet the Supreme Court said that's 
13 not enough. 
14 In this case we have one person in the 
15 general population who goes and eats dinner and decides, 
16 I am going to walk along the roadway and not walk along 
17 the walkway. There is no specific duty owed to him. 
18 There is only a general duty. The statutes he has cited 
19 give absolutely nothing but are saying, Hey, you 
20 cooperate for the safety of people, fine. We cooperate 
21 for the safety of all people. 
22 But the area they arp specifically concerned 
23 about has a specific statute that says that the State is 
24 responsible for the appurtenant structures where there 
25 is no curb. We are not talking about the place where 
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1 the State is responsible for the road fromthe back of a 
2 curb to across the lanes to the back of the next curb. 
3 That's not what we are talking about. We are talking 
4 about a structure where there is no curb, where you have 
5 a sidewalk along a structure. 
6 And the State law says, that it is the 
7 State's liability with regard to controlling 
8 transients. It's tough to control transients. The 
9 argument can be made for the group of, for example, a 
10 Jewish person who walks past, or a colored person who 
11 walks past the Ku Klux Klan and is attacked. And we are 
12 saying, Hey, you should have stopped them from 
13 gathering. Sometimes you have no idea what's going on. 
14 The same thing is true if a Jewish person is attacked by 
15 J a group of people in society, the same thing as here. 
16 The police and the City are bound. We cannot 
17 arrest an individual unless there is probable cause to 
18 show that he has committed a crime, and a misdemeanor 
19 has to be committed in the officer's presence. 
20 How on earth can we go in and violate all 
21 these people's rights who have the right to congregate 
22 as long as they do so peacefully and yet protect the 
23 people who happen to get in the midst who this group of 
24 people doesn't particularly like, whether they be 
25 Whites, Black, Jews, you name them -- for that matter, 
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1 the Arabs walking in a Jewish community nowadays. 
2 What we are saying is, there is a general 
3 duty. We'll do what we can with a general duty. And 
4 when there is a specific duty, we'll take care of the 
5 issue. But we cannot go in wholesale and arrest people 
6 because it violates their civil rights. Thank you. 
7 THE COURT: Before you sit down, on this 
8 question of duty as far as the highway is concerned. 
9 MR. HAWKINS: As far as the highway is 
10 concerned, I'm not sure, getting into the special duty. 
11 And if you take the Supreme Court to the extent that the 
12 Ferree case says that it should go, coupled with the 
13 Beach case, I suppose you can say there will never be 
14 a specific duty unless a public official happens to spot 
15 the problem and fails to intercede and solve it right 
16 then immediately. I am not sure I can give you any kind 
17 of a specific time when a private duty doctrine would 
18 exist. I'm sure if I were imaginative enough, I might 
19 come up with one. 
20 But 1 will suggest that the Ferree case 
21 puts a big burden on the plaintiff's case to do that. 
22 But they have not shown any steps to show that the duty 
23 was owed by the City as to that, absolutely none. And I 
24 think that's the kind of obligation to place the City in 
25 a specific duty to an individual, and not for me to 
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generate out of a whole mass an area where one might 
occur. But they have not done so. 
THE COURT: And do you base that on strictly 
the concept of curb to curb? 
MR. HAWKINS: Well, what they are talking 
about is where the State has -- he is talking about the 
statute where it says the State and the City cooperate. 
Okay? The law on the State -- and I don't happen to 
have the thing here. But if you have a Volume 27, I'll 
be happy to point it out for you. For example, on State 
Street, which is a State road, the State maintains it 
from the back of the curb across the lanes across the 
median and across the lanes to the back of the other 
curb. The sidewalk is maintained by the City. And we 
cooperate, even though the whole right-of-way is a State 
right-of-way. 
In this particular case, that's not what we 
are talking about. We are talking about North Temple 
which comes, and instead of having sidewalks that walk 
along, it crosses the railroad tracks. You have the 
viaduct which rises over the tracks to allow the trains 
through. And in those instances the law that I cited to 
you specifically says, Where there is no curb involved, 
it is the State's responsibility to maintain the roadway 
and all appurtenant structures including the sidewalk 
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1 that is built there. 
2 And it is true that the sidewalk does not 
3 drop all the way down to where the road starts to rise. 
4 But it is also true that that sidewalk comes all the way 
5 down and drops in to a sidewalk that is completely 
6 safe. In fact, there is nothing wrong with the concept 
7 of the sidewalk at all. What they are claiming is wrong 
8 is that their client was hassled by transients, went and 
9 ate dinner, didn't check if the transients were there, 
10 didnft do anything. He just decided to walk on the 
11 roadway. 
12 MR. BURNETT: Your Honor, clarification. 
13 The Governmental Immunity Act does not waive 
14 all other immunities or defenses that there might 
15 exist. Indeed, Section 4 of the Act expressly retains 
16 and says, This Act does not do away with any other state 
17 or federal law that might grant some kind of immunity or 
18 defense to this state. And for that reason the idea of 
19 duty is operable. 
20 I think all the other parts, indeed part of 
21 the negligence, itself, is having to show that duty of 
22 care plus the breach thereof to show someone is 
23 negligent. But leaving duty, your Honor, I think that 
24 counsel has already said what needs to be said there. 
25 As to the question of the allegation of 
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1 defect, the plaintiff has said that: it's defective 
2 because there are transients underneath where the 
3 walkway reaches the earth and goes to a sidewalk. Well, 
4 your Honor, that's not a defect of the structure. That 
5 might be a concern. But that's not a defect that the 
6 Department of Transportation can be implicated for. 
7 The Department of Transportation has never 
8 been claimed by anyone to have police powers to seek to 
9 attempt or force people to move on from land or 
10 property. It cannot be held the fault of the UDOT that 
11 there might have been transients that congregated 
12 underneath the North Temple overpass at the place where 
13 the pedestrian walkway reached the ground. 
14 But also, your Honor, all the allegations 
15 about the exceptions, the waiver that avoids 
16 discretionary function have one defect. The case cited 
17 by the plaintiff, I can cite another one, Biqelow v. 
18 Ingersol1, where they found negligence there was no 
19 discretionary function. We are not in a position of 
20 putting new, greater, a larger amount of traffic control 
21 devices or signing, but the question is of maintenance 
22 and repair of existing signing. 
23 And we would agree that this is a case where 
24 certain signs have been placed and certain control 
25 devices have been placed. And if there was an auto 
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1 accident, that would be a position that was not a 
2 discretionary function but a position to put a sign, to 
3 put further traffic control devices. That is a question 
4 of discretionary function and is not a defective 
5 maintenance and repair question. 
6 Thatfs what we have here. There has been no 
7 allegation that certain signs or control devices that 
8 would preclude plaintiff from deciding not to use the 
9 walkway but walk in a lane of traffic were there at one 
10 time and through our negligence are no longer there. 
11 It's a question of discretionary decision as to what to 
12 put, what traffic control is necessary, not a question 
13 of repairing or maintaining something already in place. 
14 THE COURT: What duty do you claim the State 
15 has to the plaintiff in walking not on the sidewalk but 
16 in the roadway? 
17 MR. BURNETT: Your Honor, to look at it, I 
18 would think -- I would say that the normal traveling 
19 public there is some duty there. We have not defined 
20 exactly what it is yet by court case. But I would 
21 envision there is no duty to someone who is not 
22 traveling in accordance with normal pattern where there 
23 is a public, open walkway away from the traffic. If 
24 that had been designed faultly so that cars crashed into 
25 it or the ground gave up and gave way and he fell 
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1 through the walkway, there would be a different 
2 question. But I don't believe there is a duty held to a 
3 person who consciously knows ot and disregards the 
4 pedestrian walkway available and chooses to take the 
5 vehicular route. It would have to be outside the duty 
6 of UDOT to anyone. 
7 MR. JENSEN: Can I say two things, Judge? 
8 THE COURT: This is their motion. If I let 
9 you, I am going to give them the right to respond if 
10 they want to. But if you want to go ahead, I am not 
1 1 that rushed. 
12 MR. JENSEN: I just want to clarify one 
13 thing. Our position is that when immunity is 
14 specifically waived under the statute by the express 
15 terms of the Governmental Immunity Act, the 
16 governmental entity is treated as though it were an 
17 individual, and that the public and private duty 
18 J distinction is not available as a defense to an 
19 individual as stated by the court that we quoted 
20 before. Where there is no immunity, the state is to be 
21 I treated as a private litigant, and that's specifically 
22 the Governmental Immunity Act. To allow the public duty 
23 doctrine to disturb this quality between plaintiff and 
24 defendant would create immunity where the legislature 
25 i has not. That's the difference. 
And that's were the Ferree case doesn't 
2 I apply here, because we are dealing with a defective and 
3 ' dangerous condition of a highway, or immunity has been 
4 specifically waived. And that's why the public defense 
5 doesn't apply. 
6 It's our position that these people --
7 Mr. Hawkins stands up here and says, How can we guard 
8 against everything? Who knows what's going to go on 
9 down there? They knew what was going on underneath 
10 there. The question was, what they did, was that 
11 J reasonable under the circumstances to fulfill their duty 
12 j to the public to prevent against that dangerous 
13 condition? And that's a fact question. To say, We 
14 | didn't know what happened, and, How are we ever going to 
15 know, certainly doesn't comport with the facts of this 
16 case where deposition testimony has shown that they knew 
17 for a long time before this accident ever happened what 
18 the problem was and what was going on underneath there. 
19 We claim that the negligence of UDOT is in 
20 failing to sign and appropriately exclude pedestrians 
21 from the overpass and that that created a dangerous and 
22 defective condition. And again, the immunity has been 
23 specifically waived for that condition, and that the 
24 public or private duty dichotomy and defense doesn't 
25 apply in those circumstances. 
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1 And I guess I should, just because I 
2 mentioned that — no additional legal argument, I 
3 promise -- I just want to move to publish because I 
4 didn't file a specific motion to publish the deposition 
5 of Norm Thompson who is a police officer we deposed and 
6 is mentioned in the brief. I don't think the original 
7 has been circulated. But I move to publish Norm 
8 Thompson's deposition in conjunction to these motions. 
9 MR. HAWKINS: I have no objection to that. 
10 And if you would like, I have a copy of the deposition. 
11 THE COURT: It may be published. 
12 MR. BURNETT: Your Honor, I will be brief. I 
13 will be speaking for myself and Mr. Hawkins. 
14 Very quickly, any case of forgetting 
15 sovereign immunity completely requires a duty of care 
16 found by the court that there be a breach. It's not a 
17 question of public or private duty being done away 
18 with. Sovereign immunity, as the court said in 
19 Ferree, it's a separate issue. Was there a duty of 
20 care such that the public entity can be found to be 
21 negligent? Did they owe that duty? It's not a question 
22 of immunity at all. It's a separate, distinct question 
23 of negligence. Was there a duty? 
24 THE COURT: Well, let me rule. And let me 
25 indicate to you I have spent considerable time reading 
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1 the memorandums. And of course motion for summary 
2 judgments can be very summary sometimes, and they are 
3 something the Court tries to consider all things and 
4 hopes that they are considering all the law and being 
5 fair to all parties concerned. 
6 But the Court is of the opinion that, even 
7 though sovereign immunity has been alleged and it does 
8 come into play here, that you cannot ignore the basic 
9 tort doctrines, negligent doctrines that you must look 
10 at with the sovereign immunity. I am of the opinion and 
11 I so rule that the City, which also involves the State, 
12 that it is a discretionary function as far as the police 
13 activity in controlling the transient activities. And I 
14 don't think that the State or the City had a specific 
15 duty to the plaintiff in this case as far as controlling 
16 of those activities are concerned. And I rule in favor 
17 of the defendants on that. 
18 The Court is also of the opinion — although 
19 I think this gets into a tougher decision, and that's 
20 the question of the maintenance of the highway. I don't 
21 think it's the proximate cause. And I will acknowledge 
22 that the proximate cause is a jury question in most 
23 situations. But I don't think here in this situation --
24 I think the plaintiff has failed to show a proximate 
25 cause as far as the causation of this accident. I don't 
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1 I think that the City and the State had a duty towards 
2 that individual. It was a situation of where he chose 
3 to place himself. 
4 I don't think it's a discretionary function 
5 as far as the signing of the highways are concerned. I 
6 think once a highway has been signed, that it's 
7 something that if it's been done in a negligent manner, 
8 then I am of the opinion that that could go to a jury. 
9 But I am not persuaded here in this situation that there 
10 was any duty to this individual to post any sign for him 
11 not to walk on the roadway. 
12 And also, as I say, the plaintiff failed to 
13 show a proximate causation as far as the injuries are 
14 concerned in this Court's mind. 
15 And based on that, I don't know if it's 
16 necessary for me to rule further. 
17 MR. JENSEN: Can I just get a clarification, 
18 Judge, on the no duty to sign the road. Is that based 
19 upon a general duty or is that specifically based on the 
20 public/private duty issue that was raised? 
21 THE COURT: I don't think that the State has 
22 any specific duty to an individual to sign that road, 
23 nor do I believe there is a general duty to the public 
24 to sign that road, not to walk on the road. 
25 I am also of the opinion here, and I have not 
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1 gone back and reviewed everything of which I did back 
2 before, but generally when summary judgments come of 
3 that nature that soon in a case, I give time for 
4 discovery. And of course I don't think it makes any 
5 difference to the plaintiff here. He has, I guess, two 
6 deep pockets. 
7 But I am of the opinion that the City does 
8 not have a responsibility in that situation. I think 
9 they have the statute of joint responsibility in some 
10 areas, but not in the area of this as to what is alleged 
11 as took place. 
12 MR. JENSEN: I probably won't address my 
13 motion for separate trials then. 
14 THE COURT: That may be moot. Do you want to 
15 address the area as far as the immunity statute you 
16 raised? 
17 MR. BURNETT: Your Honor, with the 
18 understanding that the case is being dismissed in toto, 
19 I don't believe that would be necessary. If plaintiff 
20 decides to appeal, I have the right to bring that and 
21 raise that issue on appeal at that time if needed as a 
22 fallback position. But the Court has already ruled. 
23 THE COURT: And that's probably true. 
24 MR. JENSEN: I am not asking for a ruling on 
25 those issues. 
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1 THE COURT: If there is no further questions 
2 then the Court will be in recess. 
3 MR. HAWKINS: Thank you, sir. 
4 MR. BURNETT: Your Honor, should I prepare the 
5 order for that? 
6 THE COURT: If you would please. 
7 | (This concludes these proceedings at 2 35 p.m 
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